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In this review we consider four distinct but closely related approaches to the
evaluation problem in empirical microeconomics: (i) social experiments, (ii) natural
experiments, (iii) matching methods, and (iv) instrumental methods. The ﬁrst of these
approaches is closest to the ‘theory’ free method of medical experimentation since it
relies on the availability of a randomised control. The last approach is closest to the
structural econometric method since it relies directly on exclusion restrictions. Natural
experiments and matching methods lie somewhere in between in the sense that they
attempt to mimic the randomised control of the experimental setting but do so with non-
experimental data and consequently place reliance on independence and/or exclusion
assumptions.
Our concern here is with the evaluation of a policy intervention at the microeconomic
level. This could include training programmes, welfare programmes, wage subsidy pro-
grammes and tax-credit programmes, for example. At the heart of this kind of policy
evaluation is a missing data problem since, at any moment in time, an individual is
either in the programme under consideration or not, but not both. If we could observe
the outcome variable for those in the programme had they not participated then there
would be no evaluation problem of the type we discuss here. Thus, constructing the
counterfactual is the central issue that the evaluation methods we discuss address. Im-
plicitly, each of the four approaches provides an alternative method of constructing the
counterfactual.
The literature on evaluation methods in economics is vast and continues to grow.
There are also many references in the literature which document the development of the
analysis of the evaluation problem in economics. In the labour market area, from which
we draw heavily in this review, the ground breaking papers were those by Ashenfelter
(1978), Ashenfelter and Card (1985) and Heckman and Robb (1985, 1986).
In many ways the social experiment method is the most convincing method of evalu-
1ation since it directly constructs a control (or comparison) group which is a randomised
subset of the eligible population. The advantages of experimental data are discussed
in papers by Bassi (1983,1984) and Hausman and Wise (1985) and were based on ear-
lier statistical experimental developments (see Cochrane and Rubin (1973) and Fisher
(1951), for example). A properly deﬁned social experiment can overcome the missing
data problem. For example, in the design of the impressive study of the Canadian Self
Suﬃciency Project reported in Card and Robbins (1998), the labour supply responses
of approximately 6000 single mothers in British Columbia to an in-work beneﬁtp r o -
gramme, in which half those eligible were randomly excluded from the programme, were
recorded. This study has produced invaluable evidence on the eﬀectiveness of ﬁnancial
incentives in inducing welfare recipients into work.
Of course, social experiments have their own drawbacks. They are rare in economics
and typically expensive to implement. They are not amenable to extrapolation. That is,
they cannot easily be used in the ex-ante analysis of policy reform proposals. They also
require the control group to be completely unaﬀected by the reform, typically ruling out
spillover, substitution, displacement and equilibrium eﬀects on wages etc. None-the-less,
they have much to oﬀer in enhancing our knowledge of the possible impact of policy
reforms. Indeed, a comparison of results from non-experimental data to those obtained
from experimental data can help assess appropriate methods where experimental data
is not available. For example, the important studies by LaLonde (1986), Heckman,
Ichimura and Todd (1997) and Heckman, Smith and Clements (1997) use experimental
data to assess the reliability of comparison groups used in the evaluation of training
programmes. We draw on the results of these studies below.
It should be noted that randomisation can be implemented by area. If this corre-
sponds to a local (labour) market, then general equilibrium or market level spillover
eﬀects will be accounted for. The use of control and treatment areas is a feature of the
design of the New Deal evaluation data base in the UK. In the discussion below the
2area to area comparisons are used to comment on the likely size of general equilibrium
and spillover eﬀects.
The natural experiment approach considers the policy reform itself as an experiment
and tries to ﬁnd a naturally occurring comparison group that can mimic the properties
of the control group in the properly designed experimental context. This method is
also often labelled “diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences” since it is usually implemented by com-
paring the diﬀerence in average behaviour before and after the reform for the eligible
group with the before and after contrast for the comparison group. In the absence of a
randomised experiment and under certain very strong conditions, this approach can be
used to recover the average eﬀect of the programme on those individuals entered into
the programme - or those individuals “treated” by the programme. Thus measuring the
average eﬀect of the treatment on the treated. It does this by removing unobservable
individual eﬀects and common macro eﬀects. However, it relies on the two critically
important assumptions of (i) common time eﬀects across groups,a n d( i i )no systematic
composition changes within each group. These two assumptions make choosing a com-
parison group extremely diﬃcult. For example, in their heavily cited evaluation study
of the impact of Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) reforms on the employment of single
m o t h e r si nt h eU S ,E i s s aa n dL i e b m a n( 1996) use single women without children as one
possible control group. However, this comparison can be criticized for not satisfying
the common macro eﬀects assumption (i). In particular, the control group is already
working to a very high level of participation in the US labour market (around 95%)
and therefore cannot be expected to increase its level of participation in response to
the economy coming out of a recession. In this case all the expansion in labour market
participation in the group of single women with children will be attributed to the reform
itself. In the light of this criticism the authors also use low education childless single
women as a control group for which nonparticipation is much more common and who
have other similar characteristics to those single parents eligible to EITC.
3The matching method has a long history in non-experimental statistical evaluation
( s e eH e c k m a n ,I c h i m u r aa n dT o d d( 1997), Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) and Rubin
(1979)). The aim of matching is simple. It is to select suﬃcient observable factors that
any two individuals with the same value of these factors will display no systematic diﬀer-
ences in their reaction to the policy reform. Consequently, if each individual undergoing
the reform can be matched with an individual with the same matching variables that
has not undergone the reform, the impact on individuals of that type can be measured.
It is a matter of prior assumption as to whether the appropriate matching variables have
been chosen. If not, the counterfactual eﬀect will not be correctly measured. Again ex-
perimental data can help here in evaluating the choice of matching variables and this is
precisely the motivation for the Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997) study. As we doc-
ument below, matching methods have been extensively reﬁn e di nt h er e c e n te v a l u a t i o n
literature and are now a valuable part of the evaluation toolbox.
The instrumental variable method is the standard econometric approach to endo-
geneity. It relies on ﬁnding a variable excluded from the outcome equation but which
is also a determinant of programme participation. In the simple linear model the IV
estimator identiﬁes the treatment eﬀect removed of all the biases which emanate from a
non-randomised control. However, in heterogeneous models, in which the impact of the
programme can diﬀer in unobservable ways across participants, the IV estimator will
only identify the average treatment eﬀect under strong assumptions and ones that are
unlikely to hold in practise. Recent work by Angrist and Imbens (1994) and Heckman
and Vytlacil (1999) has provided an ingenious interpretation of the IV estimator in
terms of local treatment eﬀect parameters. We provide a review of these developments.
The distinction between homogenous and heterogeneous treatments eﬀects that is
highlighted in this recent instrumental variable literature is central to the deﬁnition of a
‘parameter of interest’ in the evaluation problem. In the homogeneous linear model there
is only one impact of the programme and it is one that would be common to participants
4and nonparticipants a like. In the heterogeneous model, those that are treated may have
ad i ﬀerent mean impact of the programme from those not treated. Certainly this is likely
to be the case in a non-experimental evaluation where participation provides some gain
to the participants. In this situation we can deﬁne a treatment on the treated parameter
that is diﬀerent from a treatment on the untreated parameter or the average treatment
eﬀect. One central issue in understanding evaluation methods is clarifying what type of
treatment eﬀect is being recovered by these diﬀerent approaches.
We should note that we do not consider fully structural econometric choice models
in this review. These have been the cornerstone of nonexperimental evaluation (and
simulation) of tax and welfare policies. They provide a comprehensive analysis of the
choice problem facing individuals deciding on programme participation. They explicitly
describe the full constrained maximisation problem and are therefore perfectly suited
for ex-ante policy simulation. Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) provide a comprehensive
survey and a discussion of the relationship of the structural choice approach to the
evaluation approaches presented here.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we lay out the
diﬀerent deﬁnitions of treatment parameters and ask: what are we trying to measure?
Section 3 considers the types of data and their implication for the choice of evaluation
method. Section 4 is the main focus of this paper as it presents a detailed comparison of
alternative methods of evaluation for non-experimental data. In section 5 we illustrate
these methods drawing on recent applications in the evaluation literature. Section 6
concludes.
2. Which Parameter of Interest?
We begin by presenting a general model of outcomes which can then assume par-
ticular forms depending on the amount of structure one wishes, or needs, to include.
There are several important decisions to be taken when speciﬁc applications are consid-
5ered, the one we are especially concerned with is whether the response to the treatment
is homogeneous across individuals or heterogeneous. Typically, we do not expect all
individuals to be aﬀected by a policy intervention in exactly the same way - there will
be heterogeneity in the impact across individuals. Consequently, there are diﬀerent
potential questions that evaluation methods attempt to answer, the most commonly
considered being the average eﬀect on individuals of a certain type. This includes a
wide range of parameters such as the population average treatment eﬀect (ATE), which
would be the outcome if individuals were assigned at random to treatment, the average
eﬀect on individuals that were assigned to treatment (TTE), the eﬀect of treatment
on agents that are indiﬀerent to participation, which is the marginal version of the lo-
cal average treatment eﬀe c t( L A T E )d i s c u s s e db e l o w ,o rt h ee ﬀect of treatment on the
untreated (TU) which is typically an interesting measure for decisions about extend-
ing some treatment to a group that was formerly excluded from treatment. Under the
homogeneous treatment eﬀect assumption all these measures are identical, but this is
clearly not true when treatment eﬀects depend on individual’s characteristics. From now
onwards, except if explicitly mentioned, anywhere we discuss heterogeneous treatment
eﬀects the analysis pertains the TTE parameter.
To make things more precise, suppose there is a policy reform or intervention at time
k for which we want to measure the impact on some outcome variable, Y . This outcome
i sa s s u m e dt od e p e n do nas e to fe x o g e n o u sv a r i a b l e s ,X, the particular relationship
being dependent on the participation status in each period t.L e t D be a dummy
variable representing the treatment status, assuming the value 1 if the agent has been
treated and 0 otherwise. The outcome’s equations can be generically represented as
follows,
Y 1
it = g1
t (Xi)+ U1
it
Y 0
it = g0
t (Xi)+ U0
it
(2.1)
where the superscript stands for the treatment status and the subscripts i and t identify
the agent and the time period, respectively. The functions g0 and g1 represent the
6relationship between the potential outcomes (Y 0,Y1) and the set of observables X and
(U0,U1) stand for the error terms of mean zero and assumed to be uncorrelated with
the regressors X.T h e X variables are not aﬀected by treatment (or pre-determined)
and are assumed known at the moment of deciding about participation. For this reason
we have excluded the time subscript from X. For comparison purposes, this means that
agents are grouped by X b e f o r et h et r e a t m e n tp e r i o da n dr e m a i ni nt h es a m eg r o u p
throughout the evaluation period. This is a general form of the switching regimes or
endogenous selection model.
We assume that the participation decision can be parameterised in the following
way: For each individual there is an index, IN, depending on a set of variables W,f o r
which enrolment occurs when this index raises above zero. That is:
INi = f (Wi)+Vi (2.2)
where Vi is the error term, and,
Dit =1 if INi > 0 and t>k
Dit =0 otherwise
. (2.3)
Except in the case of experimental data, assignment to treatment is most probably
not random. As a consequence, the assignment process is likely to lead to a non-zero cor-
relation between enrolment in the programme - represented by Dit - and the outcome’s
error term -
¡
U0,U1¢
. This happens because an individual’s participation decision is
probably based on personal unobservable characteristics that may well aﬀect the out-
come Y as well. If this is so, and if we are unable to control for all the characteristics
aﬀecting Y and D simultaneously, then some correlation between the error term and
the participation variable is expected. Any method that fails to take such problem into
account is not able to identify the true parameter of interest.
Under the above speciﬁcation, one can deﬁne the individual-speciﬁct r e a t m e n te ﬀect,
for any Xi, to be
αit (Xi)=Y 1
it − Y 0
it =
£
g1
t (Xi) − g0
t (Xi)
¤
+
£
U1
it − U0
it
¤
with t>k . (2.4)
7The diﬀerent parameters of interest measured in period t>k , can then be expressed
as:
Average Treatment Eﬀect:
αATE = E(αit|X = Xi),
Average Treatment on the Treated Eﬀect:
αTTE = E (αit|X = Xi,D t =1 ),
Average Treatment on the Untreated Eﬀect:
αTU = E (αit|X = Xi,D t =0 ).
2.1. Homogeneous Treatment Eﬀects
The simplest case is when the eﬀect is assumed to be constant across individuals,
so that
αt = αit (Xi)=g1
t (Xi) − g0
t (Xi) with t>k
for any i.B u tt h i sm e a n st h a tg1 and g0 are two parallel curves, only diﬀering in the
level, and the participation-speciﬁce r r o rt e r m sa r en o ta ﬀected by the treatment status.
The outcome’s equation (2.1) can therefore be re-written as
Yit = g0
t (Xi)+αtDit + Ui. (2.5)
2.2. Heterogeneous Treatment Eﬀects
However, it seems reasonable to assume that the treatment impact varies across
individuals. These diﬀerentiated eﬀects may come systematically through the observ-
ables’ component or be a part of the unobservables. Without loss of generality, the
8outcome’s equation (2.1) can be re-written as follows
Yit = DitY 1
it +( 1− Dit)Y 0
it
= g0
t (Xi)+αit (Xi)Dit + U0
it
= g0
t (Xi)+αt (Xi)Dit +
£
U0
it + Dit
¡
U1
it − U0
it
¢¤
(2.6)
where
αt (Xi)=E [αit (Xi)] = g1
t (Xi) − g0
t (Xi) (2.7)
is the expected treatment eﬀe c ta tt i m et among agents characterised by Xi.1
Two issues are particularly important under this more general setting. The ﬁrst
relates to the observables and their role in the identiﬁcation of the parameter of interest.
It is clear that the common support problem is central to this setting:2 contrary to
the homogeneous treatment eﬀect, this structure does not allow extrapolation to areas
of the support of X that are not represented at least among treated (if a particular
parameterisation of g0 is assumed one may be able to extrapolate among non-treated).
The second problem concerns the form of the error term, which diﬀe r sa c r o s so b -
servations according to the speciﬁc treatment status. If there is selection on the unob-
servables, the OLS estimator after controlling for the covariates X is inconsistent for
αt (X), identifying the following parameter,
E (ˆ αt (X)) = αt (X)+E(U1
t | X,Dt =1 )− E(U0
t | X,Dt =0 ) with t>k .
3. Experimental And Non-Experimental Data
3.1. Experimental Data
Under ideal conditions to be discussed below, experimental data provides the cor-
rect missing counterfactual, eliminating the evaluation problem. The contribution of
1Speciﬁcation (2.6) obviously includes (2.5) as a special case.
2By common support it is meant the subspace of individual characteristics that is represented both
among treated and non-treated.
9experimental data is to rule out bias from self-selection as individuals are randomly
assigned to the programme. To see why, imagine an experiment that randomly chooses
individuals from a group to participate in a programme - these are administered the
treatment. It means that assignment to treatment is completely independent from a
possible outcome or the treatment eﬀect. Under the assumption of no spillover (general
equilibrium) eﬀects, the group of non-treated is statistically equivalent to the treated
group in all dimensions except treatment status. The ATE within the experimental
population can be simply measured by
ˆ αATE = ¯ Y 1
t − ¯ Y 0
t t>k (3.1)
where ¯ Y
(1)
t and ¯ Y
(0)
t stand for the treated and non-treated average outcomes at a time
t after the programme.
However, a number of disrupting factors may interfere with this type of social exper-
iments, invalidating the results. First, we expect some individuals to dropout, and the
p r o c e s si sl i k e l yt oa ﬀect treatments and controls unevenly and to occur non-randomly.
The importance of the potential non-random selection may be assessed by compar-
ing the observable characteristics of the remaining treatments and controls and treat-
ment groups. Second, given the complexity of the contemporaneous welfare systems,
truly committed experimental controls may actively search for alternative programmes
and are likely to succeed. Moreover, observed behaviour of the individuals may also
change as a consequence of the experiment itself as, for instance, the oﬃcers may try
to “compensate” excluded agents by providing them detailed information about other
programmes. It is even possible that some controls end up receiving precisely the same
treatment being enrolled through other programme, which plainly invalidates the simple
experimental approach as presented above.
103.2. Non-Experimental Data
Despite the above comments, non-experimental data is even more diﬃcult to deal
with and requires special care. When the control group is drawn from the population
at large, even if satisfying strict comparability rules based on observable information,
we cannot rule out diﬀerences on unobservables that are related to programme partic-
ipation. This is the econometric selection problem as commonly deﬁned, see Heckman
(1979). In this case, using the estimator (3.1) results in a fundamental non-identiﬁcation
problem since it approximates (abstracting from other regressors in the outcome equa-
tion),
E (ˆ αATE)=α +[ E(Uit | di =1 )− E(Uit | di =0 ) ] .
Under selection on the unobservables, E(Uitdi) 6=0and E (b αATE) is expected to diﬀer
from α unless, by chance, the two ﬁnal r.h.s. terms cancel out. Thus, alternative
estimators are needed, which motivates the methods discussed in section 4 below.
4. Methods For Non-Experimental Data
The appropriate methodology for non-experimental data depends on three factors:
the type of information available to the researcher, the underlying model and the pa-
rameter of interest. Data sets with longitudinal or repeated cross-section information
support less restrictive estimators due to the relative richness of information. Not sur-
prisingly, there is a clear trade-oﬀ between the available information and the restrictions
needed to guarantee a reliable estimator.
This section starts by discussing the Instrumental Variables (IV) estimator, a fre-
quent choice when only a single cross-section is available. IV uses at least one variable
that is related with the participation decision but otherwise unrelated with the outcome.
Under the required conditions, it provides the required randomness in the assignment
rule. Thus, the relationship between the instrument and the outcome for diﬀerent par-
ticipation groups identiﬁes the impact of treatment avoiding selection problems.
11If longitudinal or repeated cross-section data is available, Diﬀerence in Diﬀerences
(DID) can provide a more robust estimate of the impact of the treatment (Heckman and
Robb (1985, 1986)3). We outline the conditions necessary for DID to reliably estimate
the parameter of interest and discuss a possible extension to generalise the common
trends assumption.
An alternative approach is the method of matching, which can be adopted with either
cross section or longitudinal data although typically detailed individual information
from the before the programme period is required (see Heckman, Ichimura and Todd
(1997), Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) and Rubin (1979)). Matching deals with the
selection process by constructing a comparison group of individuals with observable
characteristics similar to the treated. A popular choice that will be discussed uses
the probability of participation to perform matching - the so called Propensity Score
Matching.
Finally, a joint DID and matching approach may signiﬁcantly improve the quality
of non-experimental evaluation results and is the last estimator discussed4.
4.1. The Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimator
The IV method requires the existence of, at least, one regressor exclusive to the
decision rule, Z, satisfying the two following conditions:5
A1: Conditional on X, Z is not correlated with the unobservables
¡
V,U0¢
and
¡
V,U1¢
.
A2: Conditional on X, the decision rule is a non-trivial (non-constant) function of Z.
Assumption (A2) means that there is independent (from X) variation in Z that
aﬀects programme participation, or, in other words, that under a linear speciﬁcation of
3This idea is further developed in Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998), Bell, Blundell and Van
Reenen (1999).
4This is applied in Blundell, Costa Dias, Meghir and Van Reenen, 2001
5The time subscript is omitted from the IV analysis since we are assuming only one time period is
under consideration.
12the decision rule, the Z coeﬃcient(s) is(are) non-zero. Thus, in general
E (D | X,Z)=P (D =1| X,Z) 6= P (D =1| X)
Assumption (A1)m e a n st h a tZ has no impact on the outcomes equation through
the unobservable component. The only way Z is allowed to aﬀect the outcomes is
through the participation status, D. Under homogeneous treatment eﬀects, this means
Z aﬀects the level only, while under heterogeneous treatment eﬀects how much Z aﬀects
the outcome depends on the particular values of X.T h e v a r i a b l e ( s ) Z is called the
instrument(s), and is a source of exogenous variation used to approximate randomised
trials: it provides variation that is correlated with the participation decision but does
not aﬀect the potential outcomes from treatment directly.
4.1.1. The IV Estimator: Homogeneous Treatment Eﬀect
Under conditions (A1) and (A2), the standard IV procedure identiﬁes the treatment
eﬀect α using only the part of the variation in D that is associated with Z (b αIV =
cov (yi,Z i)/cov(di,Z i)). An alternative is to use both Z and X to predict D, building
an e wv a r i a b l eb D that is used in the regression instead of D. A third possibility is
directly derived by noting that, given assumption (A1) and equation (2.5),
E (Y | X,Z)=g0 (X)+αP (D =1| X,Z)
and since, from assumption (A2), there are at least two values of Z,s a yz and z + δ
(δ 6=0 ), such that P (D =1| X,Z = z) 6= P (D =1| X,Z = z + δ),
αIV =
R
S(X)[E (Y | X,Z = z) − E (Y | X,Z = z + δ)]dF (X | X ∈ S (X))
R
S(X)[P (D =1| X,Z = z) − P (D =1| X,Z = z + δ)]dF (X | X ∈ S (X))
(4.1)
=
E (Y | Z = z) − E (Y | Z = z + δ)
P (D =1| Z = z) − P (D =1| Z = z + δ)
where S (X) stands for the support of X.
134.1.2. The IV Estimator: Heterogeneous Treatment Eﬀects
Depending on the assumptions one is willing to accept, the heterogeneous frame-
work may impose additional requirements on the data for the treatment eﬀect to be
identiﬁable. We start from the simpler case given by the following assumption,
A3: Individuals do not use information on the idiosyncratic component of the treat-
ment eﬀect when deciding about participation (αi (X) − α(X) where α(X)=
E (αi|X)).
Assumption (A3) is satisﬁed if potential participants have no ap r i o r iinformation
apart from the one available to the researcher (X) and decision is based on the average
treatment eﬀect for the agent’s speciﬁc group. In such case,
E
£
U1
i − U0
i
¯ ¯X,Z,D
¤
= E [Di [αi (X) − α(X)]|X,Z]=0
which together with (A1)a n d( A 2 )i ss u ﬃcient to identify the average treatment eﬀect
E [αi | X]. Furthermore, there is no apparent reason for it to diﬀer from the eﬀect of
treatment on the treated, E [αi | X,Di =1 ]for as long as the estimated parameters are
conditional on the observables, X.
If, however, agents are aware of their own idiosyncratic gains from treatment, they
are likely to make a more informed participation decision. Selection on the unobservables
is expected, making individuals that beneﬁt more from participation to be the most
likely to participate within each X-group. Such a selection process creates correlation
between αi (X) and Z. This is easily understood given that the instrument impacts
on D, facilitating or inhibiting participation. For example, it may be that participants
with values of Z that make participation more unlikely are expected to gain on average
more from treatment than participants with values of Z that make participation more
likely to occur. Take the case where distance from home to the treatment location is
taken as an instrument. Though in general such a variable is unlikely to be related with
14outcomes such as earnings or employment probabilities, it is likely to be related with
the idiosyncratic component of the treatment eﬀect since agents living closer incur less
travelling costs and are, therefore, more likely to participate even if expecting lower gains
from treatment. Such a relationship between the instrument Z and the idiosyncratic
gain from treatment is immediately recognised formally since, from (2.1)
U1
i − U0
i =
¡
Y 1
i − Y 0
i
¢
− α(Xi)=αi (Xi) − α(Xi)
Thus, the error term under heterogeneous treatment eﬀect is
Ui = U0
i + Di [αi (Xi) − α(Xi)] (4.2)
where D i s ,b ya s s u m p t i o n ,d e t e r m i n e db yZ depending on the gain αi (Xi) − α(Xi).
Under such circumstances, assumptions (A1) and (A2) are no longer enough to iden-
tify the ATE or TTE. This happens because the average outcomes of any two groups
diﬀering on the particular Z-realisations alone are diﬀerent not only as a consequence
of diﬀerent participation rates but also because of compositional diﬀerences in the par-
ticipants (non-participants) groups according to the unobservables. Thus, the main
concern relates to the existence and identiﬁcation of regions of the support of X and
Z where changes in Z cause changes in the participation rates unrelated with potential
gains from treatment.
T h es o l u t i o na d v a n c e db yI m b e n sa n dA n g r i s t( 1994) is to identify the impact of
treatment from local changes of the instrument Z. The rationale is that some local
changes in the instrument Z reproduce random assignment by inducing agents to de-
cide diﬀerently as they face diﬀerent conditions unrelated to potential outcomes. To
guarantee that the groups being compared are indeed comparable, Imbens and Angrist
use a strengthened version of (A2),
A2’: Conditional on X, the decision rule is a non-trivial monotonic function of Z.
15In what follows, suppose D is an increasing function of Z, meaning that an increase
in Z leads some individuals to take up treatment but no one individual to give up
treatment. In an hypothetical case, where Z changes from Z = z to Z = z + δ (δ > 0),
the individuals that change their participation decisions as a consequence of the change
in Z are those that choose not to participate under Z = z excluding the ones that choose
not to participate under Z = z + δ, or, equivalently, those that decide to participate
under Z = z + δ excluding the ones that prefer participation under Z = z.T h u s ,t h e
expected outcome under treatment and non-treatment for those aﬀected by the change
in Z can be estimated as follows,
E
£
Y 1
i | Xi,D i (z)=0 ,D i (z + δ)=1
¤
=
=
E
£
Y 1
i | Xi,D i (z + δ)=1
¤
P [Di =1| Xi,z+ δ] − E
£
Y 1
i | Xi,d i (z)=1
¤
P [Di =1| Xi,z]
P [Di =1| Xi,z+ δ] − P [Di =1| Xi,z]
and
E
£
Y 0
i | Xi,D i (z)=0 ,D i (z + δ)=1
¤
=
=
E
£
Y 0
i | Xi,D i (z)=0
¤
P [Di =0| Xi,z] − E
£
Y 0
i | Xi,D i (z + δ)=0
¤
P [Di =0| Xi,z+ δ]
P [Di =1| Xi,z+ δ] − P [Di =1| Xi,z]
.
The estimated treatment eﬀect is given by,
αLATE (Xi,z,z+ δ)=E(Y 1
i − Y 0
i | Xi,D i (z)=0 ,D i (z + δ)=1 ) (4.3)
=
E [Yi | Xi,z+ δ] − E [Yi | Xi,z]
P [Di =1| Xi,z+ δ] − P [Di =1| Xi,z]
which is the Local Average Treatment Eﬀect (LATE) parameter. To illustrate the LATE
approach, take the example discussed above on selection into treatment dependent on
the distance to the treatment site. Participation is assumed to become less likely the
longest the distance from home to the treatment location. To estimate the treatment
eﬀect, consider a group of individuals that diﬀer only on the distance dimension. Among
those that participate when the distance Z equals z s o m ew o u l ds t o pp a r t i c i p a t i n gi f
at distance z + δ. LATE measures the impact of the treatment on the “movers” group
16by attributing any diﬀerence on the average outcomes of the two groups deﬁned by the
distance to the treatment site to the diﬀerent participation frequency.6
Though very similar to the IV estimator presented in (4.1), LATE is intrinsically
diﬀerent since it does not represent TTE or ATE. LATE depends on the particular
values of Z used to evaluate the treatment and on the particular instrument chosen.
The group of “movers” is not in general representative of the whole treated or, even
less, the whole population. For instance, agents beneﬁting the most from participation
a r em o r eu n l i k e l yt ob eo b s e r v e da m o n gt h em o v e r s . T h eL A T Ep a r a m e t e ra n s w e r s
ad i ﬀerent question, of how much agents at the margin of participating beneﬁtf r o m
participation given a change in policy. That is, it measures the eﬀect of treatment on
the sub-group of treated at the margin of participating for a given Z = z.T h i si sm o r e
easily seen if taking the limits when δ −→ 0, as in Heckman and Vytlacil (1999),
αMTE(Xi,z)=
∂E [Y | Xi,Z]
∂P [D =1| Xi,Z]
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
Z=z
αMTE is the Marginal Treatment Eﬀect (MTE), and is by deﬁnition the LATE para-
meter deﬁned for an inﬁnitesimal change in Z. I tr e p r e s e n t sT T Ef o ra g e n t st h a ta r e
indiﬀerent between participating and not participating at Z = z.A l lt h et h r e ep a r a m e -
t e r s ,n a m e l yA T E ,T T Ea n dL A T E ,c a nb ee x p r e s s e da sa v e r a g e so fM T Eo v e rd i ﬀerent
subsets of the Z support. The ATE is the expected value of MTE over the entire support
of Z, including the values where participation is nil or universal. The TTE excludes
only the subset of the Z-support where participation does not occur. Finally, LATE
is deﬁned as the average MTE over an interval of Z bounded by two values for which
participation rates are diﬀerent.7
6Abadie, Angrist and Imbens (1998) extend this approach to the evaluation of quantile treatment
eﬀects. The goal is to assess how diﬀerent parts of the outcome’s distribution are aﬀected by the policy.
As with LATE, a local IV procedure is used, making the estimated impacts representative only for the
sub-population of individuals changing their treatment status as a consequence of the particular change
in the instrument considered.
7The importance of the monotonic assumption depends on the parameter of interest. It is not needed
if one is willing to assess the eﬀects of a change in policy on average outcomes, which includes both
changes in participation and eﬀects of participation see (see Heckman, 1997).
174.2. The Diﬀerence In Diﬀerences (DID) Estimator
If longitudinal or repeated cross-section information is available, the additional time
dimension can be used to estimate the treatment eﬀect under less restrictive assump-
tions. Without loss of generality, re-write model (2.6) as follows,
Yit = g0
t (Xi)+αit (Xi)Dit +( φi + θt + εit) (4.4)
where the error term U0
it, is being decomposed on an individual-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect, φi,
a common macro-economic eﬀect, θt and a temporary individual-speciﬁce ﬀect, εit.T h e
main assumption underlying the DID estimator is the following,
A4: Selection into treatment is independent of the temporary individual-speciﬁce ﬀect,
εit,s ot h a t ,
E(U0
it | Xi,D i)=E(φi | Xi,D i)+θt
where Di distinguishes participants from non-participants and is, therefore, time-
independent.
Assumption (A4) is suﬃcient because φi and θt vanish in the sequential diﬀerences.8
To see why, suppose information is available for a pre- and a post-programme periods
- denoted respectively by t0 and t1 (t0 <k<t 1). DID measures the excess outcome
growth for the treated compared to the non-treated. Formally, it can be presented as
follows,
ˆ αDID (X)=
£¯ Y 1
t1 (X) − ¯ Y 1
t0 (X)
¤
−
£¯ Y 0
t1 (X) − ¯ Y 0
t0 (X)
¤
(4.5)
where ¯ Y stands for the mean outcome among the speciﬁc group being considered. Under
heterogeneous eﬀects, the DID estimator recovers the TTE since
E (ˆ αDID (X)) = E[αi (X) | Di =1 ]=αTTE(X)
8Notice that selection is allowed to occur on a temporary individual-speciﬁce ﬀect that depends on
the observables only, namely g
0
t (Xi).
18W h e r ew eh a v eo m i t t e dat i m es u b s c r i p to nαi(Xi) it refers to period t1. In the homo-
geneous eﬀect case, one may omit the covariates from equation (4.5) and average over
the complete groups of treated and non-treated.
4.2.1. The DID Estimator: The Common Trends And Time Invariant Com-
position Assumptions
In contrast to the IV estimator, no exclusion restrictions are required under the
DID methodology as there is no need for any regressor in the decision rule. Even
the outcome equation may remain unspeciﬁed as long as the treatment impact enters
additively. However, assumption (A4) together with the postulated speciﬁcation (4.4)
brings two main weaknesses to the DID approach. The ﬁrst problem relates to the
lack of control for unobserved temporary individual-speciﬁc components that inﬂuence
the participation decision. If ε is not unrelated to D, DID is inconsistent and in fact
approximates the following parameter,
E (ˆ αDID (X)) = αTTE(X)+E(εit1 − εit0 | Di =1 )− E(εit1 − εit0 | Di =0 )
To illustrate the conditions such inconsistency might arise, suppose a training pro-
gramme is being evaluated in which enrolment is more likely if a temporary dip in
earnings occurs just before the programme takes place (so-called Ashenfelter’s dip, see
Heckman and Smith (1994)). A faster earnings growth is expected among the treated,
even without programme participation. Thus, the DID estimator is likely to over-
estimate the impact of treatment. Moreover, if instead of longitudinal data one uses
cross-section data, the problem is likely to worsen as it may extend to the ﬁxed eﬀect
(φi) component: the before-after comparability of the groups under an unknown selec-
tion rule may be severely aﬀected as the composition of the groups may change over
time and be aﬀected by the intervention, causing E (φi | Di) to change artiﬁcially with
t.
The second weakness occurs if the macro eﬀect has a diﬀerential impact across the
19two groups. This happens when the treatment and comparison groups have some (pos-
sibly unknown) characteristics that distinguish them and make them react diﬀerently
to common macro shocks. This motivates the diﬀerential trend adjusted DID estimator
that is presented below.
4.2.2. The DID Estimator: Adjusting For Diﬀerential Trends
Replace (A4) by
A4’ Selection into treatment is independent of the temporary individual-speciﬁce ﬀect,
εit,u n d e rd i ﬀerential trends
E(Uit | Di)=E(φi | Di)+kDθt
where the kD acknowledges the diﬀerential macro eﬀect across the two groups.
The DID estimator now identiﬁes
E (b αDID (X)) = αTTE(X)+( k1 − k0)[θt1 − θt0] (4.7)
which clearly only recovers the true TTE when k1 = k0.
Now suppose we take another time interval, say t∗ to t∗∗ (with t∗ <t ∗∗ <k ), over
which a similar macro trend has occurred. Precisely, we require a period for which the
macro trend matches the term (k1 − k0)[θt1 − θt0] in (4.7). It is likely that the most
recent cycle is the most appropriate, as earlier cycles may have systematically diﬀerent
eﬀects across the target and comparison groups. The diﬀerentially adjusted estimator
proposed by Bell, Blundell and Van Reenen (1999), which takes the form
b αTADID(X)=
n
(e Y 1
t1 − e Y 1
t0) − (e Y 0
t1 − e Y 0
t0)
o
−
n
(e Y 1
t∗∗ − e Y 1
t∗) − (e Y 0
t∗∗ − e Y 0
t∗)
o
(4.8)
will now consistently estimate αTTE.
To illustrate this approach, lets consider the case where treatments and controls
belong to diﬀerent cohorts. Suppose treatments are drawn from a younger cohort,
20making them more responsive to macroeconomic cycles. If the outcome of interest is
aﬀected by the macro conditions, we expect the time-speciﬁce ﬀect to diﬀer between
treatments and controls. But if similar cyclical conditions were observed in the past
and the response of the two groups has been kept unchanged, it is possible to ﬁnd a
past period characterised by the same diﬀerential, θt1 − θt0.
4.3. The Matching Estimator
The third method we present is the matching approach. Like the DID, matching
does not require an exclusion restriction or a particular speciﬁcation of the participation
decision or the outcomes equation. It also does not require the additive speciﬁcation
of the error term as postulated for the DID estimator. Its additional generality comes
from being a non-parametric method, which also makes it quite versatile in the sense
that it can easily be combined with other methods to produce more accurate estimates.
The cost is paid with data: matching requires abundant good quality data to be at all
meaningful.
The main purpose of matching is to re-establish the conditions of an experiment
when no randomised control group is available. As we have noted, total random assign-
ment allows for a direct comparison of the treated and non-treated, without particular
structure requirements. The matching method aims to construct the correct sample
counterpart for the missing information on the treated outcomes had they not been
treated by pairing each participant with members of non-treated group. Under the
matching assumption, the only remaining diﬀerence between the two groups is pro-
gramme participation.
The solution advanced by matching is based on the following assumption,
A5: Conditional independence assumption (CIA): conditional on the set of observables
X, the non-treated outcomes are independent of the participation status,
Y 0 ⊥ D | X
21That is, given X the non-treated outcomes are what the treated outcomes would have
been had they not been treated or, in other words, selection occurs only on observables.
For each treated observation (Y 1) we can look for a non-treated (set of) observation(s)
(Y 0)w i t ht h es a m eX-realisation. With the matching assumption, this Y 0 constitutes
the required counterfactual. Thus, matching is a process of re-building an experimental
data set.
The second assumption guarantees that the required counterfactual actually exists
A 6 :A l lt r e a t e da g e n t sh a v eac o u n t e r p a r to nt h en o n - t r e a t e dp o p u l a t i o na n da n y o n e
constitutes a possible participant:
0 <P (D =1| X) < 1
However, assumption (A6) does not ensure that the same happens within any sample,
and is, in fact, a strong assumption when programmes are directed to tightly speciﬁed
groups.
Call S∗ to the common support of X. Assuming (A5) and (A6), a subset of com-
parable observations is formed from the original sample and a consistent estimator for
TTE is produced using the empirical counterpart of
R
S∗ E(Y 1 − Y 0 | X, D =1 )dF(X | D =1 )
R
S∗ dF(X | D =1 )
at a time t>k (4.9)
where the numerator represents the expected gain from the programme among the
subset of sampled participants for whom one can ﬁnd a comparable non-participant
(that is, over S∗). To obtain a measure of the TTE, individual gains must be integrated
over the distribution of observables among participants and re-scaled by the measure
of the common support, S∗. Therefore, equation (4.9) represents the expected value of
the programme eﬀect over S∗.9 If (A5) is fulﬁlled and the two populations are large
enough, the common support is the entire support of both.
9It is simply the mean diﬀerence in outcomes over the common support, appropriately weighted by
the distribution of participants.
22The challenge of matching is to ensure that the ‘correct’ set of observables X is being
used so that the observations of non-participants are what the observations of treated
would be had they not participated, forming the right counterfactual and satisfying
CIA. In practical terms, however, the more detailed the information is, the harder it is
to ﬁnd a similar control and the more restricted the common support becomes. That
is, the appropriate trade-oﬀ between the quantity of information at use and the share
of the support covered may be diﬃcult to achieve. If, however, the right amount of
information is used, matching deals well with potential bias. This is made clear by
decomposing the treatment eﬀect in the following way
E(Y 1 − Y 0 | X,D =1 )={E(Y 1 | X,D =1 )− E(Y 0 | X,D =0 ) }− (4.10)
− {E(Y 0 | X,D =1 )− E(Y 0 | X,D =0 ) }
where the latter term is the bias conditional on X. Conditional on X, the only reason
t h et r u ep a r a m e t e r ,αTTE(X), might not be identiﬁed is selection on the unobservables.
Note, however, if one integrates over the common support S∗, two additional causes
of bias can occur: non-overlapping support of X and misweighting over the common
support. Through the process of choosing and re-weighting observations, matching
corrects for the latter two sources of bias and selection on the unobservables is assumed
to be zero.
4.3.1. The Matching Estimator: The Use Of Propensity Score
As with all non-parametric methods, the dimensionality of the problem as measured
by X may seriously limit the use of matching. A more feasible alternative is to match
on a function of X. Usually, this is carried out on the propensity to participate given
the set of characteristics X: P(Xi)=P(Di =1| Xi) the propensity score.I t s u s e
is usually motivated by Rosenbaum and Rubin’s result (1983, 1984), which shows that
23the CIA remains valid if controlling for P(X) instead of X:
Y 0 ⊥ D | P(X)
More recently, a study by Hahn (1998) shows that P(X) is ancillary for the estimation
of ATE. However, it is also shown that knowledge of P(X) may improve the eﬃciency
of the estimates of TTE, its value lying on the “dimension reduction” feature.
When using P(X), the comparison group for each treated individual is chosen with a
pre-deﬁned criteria (established by a pre-deﬁned measure) of proximity. Having deﬁned
the neighbourhood for each treated observation, the next issue is that of choosing the
appropriate weights to associate the selected set of non-treated observations for each
participant one. Several possibilities are commonly used, from a unity weight to the
nearest observation and zero to the others, to equal weights to all, or kernel weights, that
account for the relative proximity of the non-participants’ observations to the treated
ones in terms of P(X).
In general the form of the matching estimator is given by
b αM =
X
i∈T



Yi −
X
j∈C
WijYj



wi (4.11)
where T and C represent the treatment and comparison groups respectively, Wij is
t h ew e i g h tp l a c e do nc o m p a r i s o no b s e r v a t i o nj for individual i and wi accounts for the
re-weighting that reconstructs the outcome distribution for the treated sample.10
4.3.2. The Matching Estimator: Parametric Approach
Speciﬁc functional forms assumed for the g-functions in (2.1) can be used to esti-
mate the impact of treatment on the treated over the whole support of X,r e ﬂecting the
10For example, in the nearest neighbour matching case the estimator becomes
b αMM =
X
i∈T
{Yi − Yj}
1
NT
where, among the non-treated, j is the nearest neighbour to i in terms of P(X). In general, kernel
weights are used for Wij to account for the closeness of Yj to Yi.
24trade-oﬀ between the structure one is willing to impose in the model and the amount
of information that can be extracted from the data. To estimate the impact of treat-
ment under a parametric set-up, one needs to estimate the relationship between the
observables and the outcome for the treatment and comparison groups and predict the
respective outcomes for the population of interest. A comparison between the two sets
of predictions supplies an estimate of the impact of the programme. In this case, one can
easily guarantee that outcomes being compared come from populations sharing exactly
the same characteristics.11
4.4. Matching and DID
The CIA is quite strong once it is acknowledged that individuals may decide ac-
cording to their forecast outcome. However, by combining matching with DID there
is scope for an unobserved determinant of participation as long as it lies on separable
individual and/or time-speciﬁc components of the error term. To clarify the exposition,
lets take model (4.4).12 If performing matching on the set of observables X within this
setting, the CIA can now be replaced by,
(εt1 − εt0) ⊥ D | X
where t0 <k<t 1.S i n c e D I D e ﬀectively controls for the other components of the
outcomes under non-treatment, only the temporary individual-speciﬁcs h o c kr e q u i r e s
additional control. The main matching hypothesis is now stated in terms of the before-
after evolution instead of levels. It means that controls have evolved from a pre- to a
p o s t - p r o g r a m m ep e r i o di nt h es a m ew a yt r e a t m e n t sw o u l dh a v ed o n eh a dt h e yn o tb e e n
11If, for instance, a linear speciﬁc a t i o ni sa s s u m e dw i t hc o m m o nc o e ﬃcients for treatments and con-
trols, so that
Y = Xβ + αTTED + U
then no common support requirement is needed to estimate αTTE - a simple OLS regression using all
information on treated and non-treated will consistently identify it.
12An extension to consider diﬀerential trends can be considered similarly to what have been discussed
before.
25treated.
The eﬀect of the treatment on the treated can now be estimated over the common
support of X, S∗,u s i n ga ne x t e n s i o nt o( 4 . 11),
b αLD
MDID =
X
i∈T



[Yit1 − Yit0] −
X
j∈C
Wij [Yjt1 − Yjt0]



wi
where the notation is similar to what has been used before.
Quite obviously, this estimator requires longitudinal data to be applied. However,
it is possible to extend it for the repeated cross-sections data case. If only repeated
cross-sections are available, one must perform matching three times for each treated
individual after treatment: to ﬁnd the comparable treated before the programme and
the controls before and after the programme. If the same assumptions apply, the TTE
is identiﬁed by,
b αRCS
MDID =
X
i∈T1




Yit1 −
X
j∈T0
WT
ijt0Yjt0

 −


X
j∈C1
WC
ijt1Yjt1 −
X
j∈C1
WC
ijt0Yjt0





wi
where T0, T1, C0 and C1 stand for the treatment and comparison groups before and after
the programme, respectively, and WG
ijt represent the weights attributed to individual j
in group D (where G = C or T)a n dt i m et when comparing with treated individual
i (for a more detailed discussion with application of the combined matching and DID
estimator, see Blundell, Costa Dias, Meghir and Van Reenen, 2001).
5. Interpreting the Evidence
In this section we brieﬂy draw on some recent studies to illustrate some of the
non-experimental techniques presented in this review. The studies presented below
show that the methods we have described should be carefully applied and even more
cautiously interpreted (see also Blundell and Costa-Dias (2000)).
265.1. The LaLonde Study and the NSWD Evaluation
LaLonde (1986) aimed at assessing the reliability of the non-experimental tech-
niques by comparing the results produced by these methods as commonly applied and
the true parameters obtained using experimental data. This study used the National
Supported Work Demonstration (NSWD), a programme operated in 10s i t e sa c r o s sU S A
and designed to help disadvantaged workers, in particular women in receipt of AFDC
(Aid for Families with Dependent Children), ex-drug addicts, ex-criminal oﬀenders and
high-school drop-outs. Qualiﬁed applicants were randomly assigned to treatment, which
comprised a guaranteed job for 9 to 18 months. Treatment and control groups summed
up to 6,616 individuals. Data on all participants were collected before, during and after
treatment takes place, and earnings were the chosen outcome measure.
To assess the reliability of the experimental design, Lalonde presents pre-treatment
earnings and other demographic variables for treatments and controls (males). As far
as can be inferred from the observables, treatments and controls are not diﬀerent be-
fore the treatment takes place. In the absence of non-random drop-outs and with no
alternative treatment oﬀered and no changes in behaviour induced by the experiment,
the controls constitute the perfect counterfactual to estimate the treatment impact.
An analysis of the earnings evolution for treated and controls from a pre-programme
year, 1975, through the treatment periods, 1976-77, until the post-programme period,
1978, it can be seen that the treated group and control group earnings were nearly the
same before treatment. They then diverged substantially during the programme and
somehow converged after it. The estimated impact one year after treatment is almost
+$900.
To evaluate the quality of the non-experimental techniques, Lalonde applied a set of
diﬀerent methods using both the control group and a number of other, non-experimentally
determined, comparison groups. The aim being to reproduce what the participants
would have been in the absence of the programme. The comparison groups were drawn
27from either the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) or from the Current Population
Survey - Social Security Administration (CPS-SSA). Tables 5 and 6 of LaLonde reveal
the robustness of the experimental results to the choice of estimator. They show that
using comparisons from non-experimental samples signiﬁcantly changes the results and
raises the problem of dependence on the adopted speciﬁcation for the earnings function
and participation decision.
5.2. A Critique of the Lalonde Study
LaLonde’s results have been criticised on the basis that the chosen non-experimental
comparison groups do not satisfy the necessary requests to successfully identify the cor-
rect parameter (see Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997, and Heckman, Ichimura, Smith
and Todd, 1998). It is argued that to ask for identiﬁcation of the true parameter from
t h ed a t au s e di nL a L o n d e( 1986) to construct the counterfactual is to make unfair re-
quests on data that has not been selected to truly represent what the treated would
have been without treatment. Three main reasons are pointed out: First, comparisons
are not drawn from the same local labour markets; Second, data on treated and compar-
isons were collected from diﬀerent questionnaires and does not, therefore, measure the
same characteristics; and Third, data are not rich enough to clearly distinguish between
individuals.
A recent study by Smith and Todd (2000) is based on precisely the same data that
was used by LaLonde. A careful evaluation of the bias present in non-experimental stud-
ies is performed by using a variety of methodologies and experimenting with the data.
They use LaLonde’s outcome variable, earnings, and directly compare non-experimental
comparisons with experimental controls to obtain a measure of the bias.
This study suggests that matching may substantially improve the results when only
cross-section data is available, in which case a careful choice of the matching variables
is central for the quality of the estimates. When using longitudinal data, however, other
28demands on information are somewhat relaxed. The quality of the estimates improves
signiﬁcantly and to the same order of magnitude independently of the technique or
amount of information used. It seems as if much of the key information in a cross-
section analysis pertains to variables that stay relatively constant over time and that
cancel out on the sequential diﬀerencing that characterises DID.
5.3. A Simulation Study
To further investigate the accuracy of non-experimental methods, Heckman and
Smith (1998, see also Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999) ran a fully controlled ex-
periment based on simulated data. Data were created with an individual’s model of
participation and earnings and subsequently used to illustrate how biased the diﬀerent
methods are under diﬀerent underlying hypotheses. Such approach requires a struc-
tural model of individual’s decisions to be established ap r i o r i , and the results depend
on the particular speciﬁcation assumed. The model considered allows for heterogeneous
responses, αi, but these are assumed to be independent from all other error components
in the model. Perfect certainty is also assumed except for one case where the individual-
speciﬁc gains from training, αi − E (α), are not known at the moment of enrolling into
treatment. The model reproduces the widely discussed Ashenfelter’s dip.
Given a particular choice of the parameters, the model was used to simulate the
behaviourof 1000 individuals over 10pe r i od s( f r o mk−5 to k+4, where k is the treatment
period) 100 times under diﬀerent assumptions. The results of this simulation show the
bias by type of estimator for unmatched and matched samples, where matching is based
on earnings two periods before treatment (k−2). In each case, three possible estimators
are considered: the simple cross-sectional diﬀerences (CS), DID using periods k−3 and
k +3and IV. The magnitude of the bias is computed under four possible underlying
hypotheses about the nature of the eﬀect (homogeneous vs heterogeneous), the amount
of information available to the agent at the enrolling period and the magnitude of the
29variability of α.
Under the homogeneity assumption the CS estimator is severely downward biased.
DID controls for the ﬁxed eﬀect and signiﬁcantly reduces the bias. It is, however, nega-
tively aﬀected by matching mainly due to the period matching takes place: controls are
selected to reproduce treatments at k − 2 but they start diﬀerentiating immediately at
k − 1 by recovering earlier in time from the characteristic dip in earnings. Finally, as
expected, IV performs well and is consistent in this case. Relaxing the homogeneity as-
sumption but allowing agents only know about E (α) before taking treatment, the same
conclusions can be drawn. Finally, in the heterogeneous / perfect foresight case, CS and
DID perform better given that selection now occurs largely on αi.D I D ,i np a r t i c u l a r ,
shows remarkable small bias. In contrast IV performs much worse now, a feature that
is not unexpected since IV is not consistent for TTE under these conditions. It does,
however, consistently estimate LATE since the model satisfy Imbens and Angrist (1994)
monotonicity assumption. In the unmatched case, the LATE parameter is estimated to
deviate 25% from the TTE. With increased variability on αi the performance improves
for CS and DID as participation decisions are more heavily based of αi,b u tL A T Ed o e s
not seem to get closer to TTE.
5.4. Matching and Diﬀerence in Diﬀerences: An Area Based Evaluation of
the British ‘New Deal’ Program
The ‘New Deal for the Young Unemployed’ is an initiative to provide work incentives to
individuals aged 18t o2 4a n dc l a i m i n gJ o bS e e k e r sA l l o w a n c e( J S A )f o r6m o n t h s( s e e
Bell, Blundell and Van Reenen, 1999). The program was ﬁrst introduced in January
1998, following the election of a new government in Britain in the previous year. It
combines initial job search assistance followed by various subsidized options including
wage subsidies to employers, temporary government jobs and full time education and
training. Prior to the New Deal, young people in the UK could, in principle, claim un-
employment beneﬁts indeﬁnitely. Now, after 6 months of unemployment, young people
30enter the New Deal ‘Gateway’, which is the ﬁrst period of job search assistance. The
program is mandatory, including the subsidized options part, which at least introduces
an interval in the claiming spell.
The Blundell, Costa-Dias, Meghir and Van Reenen (2001) study investigates the
impact of the program on employment in the ﬁrst 18 months of the scheme. In particular
it exploits an important design feature by which the programme was rolled out in certain
pilot areas prior to the national roll out. Since the programme is targeted at a speciﬁc
age group a natural comparison group would be similar individuals with corresponding
unemployment spells but who are slightly too old to be eligible. A before and after
comparison can then be made using a regular DID estimator. This can be improved by a
matching DID estimator as detailed in section 4.4. These estimators are all implemented
in the study. The pilot area based design also means that matched individuals of the
same age can be used as an alternative control group. These are not only likely to
satisfy the quasi-experimental conditions more closely but also allow an analysis of the
degree to which the DID comparisons within the treatment areas suﬀer from general
equilibrium or market level biases and whether they suﬀer from serious substitution
eﬀects.
The evaluation approach therefore consists of exploring sources of diﬀerential eligi-
bility and diﬀerent assumptions about the relationship between the outcome and the
participation decision to identify the eﬀects of the New Deal. On the ‘diﬀerential eli-
gibility’ side, two potential sources of identiﬁcation are used. First, the fact that the
program is age-speciﬁc implies that using slightly older people of similar unemployment
duration is a natural comparison group. Second, the fact that the program was ﬁrst pi-
loted for 3 months (January to March 1998) in selected areas before being implemented
nation-wide (the ‘National Roll Out’ beginning April 1998). As mentioned already this
provides an additional dimension to explore on the construction of the control groups,
especially concerning substitution and equilibrium wage eﬀects. Substitution occurs if
31participants take (some of) the jobs that non-participants would have got in the absence
of treatment. Equilibrium wage eﬀects may occur when the program is wide enough to
aﬀect the wage pressure of eligible and ineligible individuals.
The study focuses on the change in transitions from the unemployed claimant count
to jobs during the Gateway period. It ﬁnds that the outﬂow rate for men has risen by
about 20% as a result of the New Deal programme. Similar results show up from the
use of within area comparisons using ineligible age groups as controls and also from the
use of individuals who satisfy the eligibility criteria but reside in non-pilot areas. Such
an outcome suggests that either wage and substitution eﬀects are not very strong or
they broadly cancel each other out. The results appear to be robust to pre-program
selectivity, changes in job quality and diﬀerent cyclical eﬀects.
6. Conclusions
This paper has presented an overview of alternative empirical methods for the
evaluation of policy interventions at the microeconomic level. It has focussed on social
experiments, natural experiments, matching methods, and instrumental variable meth-
ods. The idea has been to describe the assumptions and data requirements of each
approach and to assess the parameters of interest that they are able to estimate. The
a p p r o p r i a t ec h o i c eo fe v a l u a t i o nm e t h o dh a sb e e ns h o w nt od e p e n do nac o m b i n a t i o no f
the data available and the policy parameter of interest. No one method dominates and
all methods rest on heavy assumptions. Even social experiments rely on strong assump-
tions: they rule out spill over eﬀects and are sensitive to non-random drop outs from the
programme. Natural experiment methods, matching methods and instrumental vari-
able methods all place tough requirements on the data and are fragile to untestable
assumptions. Moreover, with heterogeneous response parameters, they each estimate
diﬀerent aspects of the programme impact. It is essential to have a clear understanding
of the assumptions and data requirements involved in each method before undergoing
32an evaluation.
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